Book reviews by Shusterman, Richard et al.
BOOK REVIEWS 
ARISTOTLE AND HIS WORLD VIEW, by Franz Brentano, Edited 
and translated by R. George & R.M. Chisholm. Berkeley: University 
of  California Press 1978, XII, 138 pp. 
Aristotle was for a thousand years The Philosopher, and certainly 
he was the philosopher kat exochen for Brentano. The founder of 
descriptive psychology not only published five books and numerous 
articles on Aristotle, he also left more than 5,000 pages in about 150 
manuscripts, notes and dictations on the philosophy of the Stagirite. 
Only a few pieces of  this vast Nachlafl have been published so far. 
The present book was written and published six years before 
Brentano's death. Thus, it is a later product of his extensive Aristo- 
telian Studies. But it also reflects his own philosophy, as Chisliolm 
quite clearly points out in his preface. Like other great philosophers, 
Brentano has the ability to see things in a new light, and it is worth- 
while to look at Aristotle with his perspective. 
The book starts with the description of Aristotle's vita and 
writings, the definition of sophia as the aim of all intellectual activities, 
the identification of the object of sophia as being (.in the proper 
sense), and the explication of immediately evident truths (the 
existence of which Brentano accepts as given). Immediately evident 
in this sense are - according to Brentano - only two types of propo- 
sitions: those which express the infallible perception of ourselves 
as perceiving something and those which express negative judgments 
not only regarding possible states of affairs but also regarding what 
is impossible. What is impossible is so in virtue of  a contradiction. 
Therefore all a priori true propositions are instances of  the law of  
noncontradiction. To be used, a priori principles need ideas which 
we acquire through perception alone. According to Aristotle there 
are no innate ideas. Because of  the empirical origin of our ideas, we 
have to accept limits of our understanding. Very simple, very true. 
The question of how these ideas are to be entertained, is the question 
of categorization. But what the elements of  this categorization'really 
are we are not clearly told. 
225 
BOOK REVIEWS 
The next chapters - all very short - deal with substance, with its 
possible and real changes, and therefore with the problems of cause. 
And as soon as Aristotle or Brentano speaks of  cause, he speaks of  
the meanings of 'cause' too. Thus, we are led to a first cause, or a 
Ftrst ground, of  all reality - i.e., to an infinitely perfect and necessary 
intellect. But how do we get the idea of such an intellect? By means 
of  the very same principle which says that what is not of  itself 
necessary must have its ground in something else. This is the step 
which, because it seems both so crucial and so suspect, has provoked 
so much controversy. 
The second half of the book is dedicated to expounding the notion 
of  an absolutely necessary Being or God and to setting forth the con- 
sequences of  this notion in regard to the concepts of  cause, will, tele- 
ology, theodicy, etc. Again and again we Fred in Aristotle the same 
type of consideration that is present i n  Brentano's own works: 
namely, that what is to be justified has to be justified by reasons or 
grounds which do not rely on further conditions. So, e.g., if something 
is not absolutely necessary either in its parts or in its moments, it 
cannot be absolutely necessary as a whole. To take another example: 
in the chain of  natural generation potentiality precedes actuality in 
the individual case; yet, from an absolute point of  view, there must 
be a first principle, such that actuality precedes potentiality. The 
final principle, however, is thought of as an intellectual substance, 
the first cause of all activity and all order in the world. "Its existence 
is the first inherently necessary positive truth; all other positive truth 
is an unsuperable consequence of it." It is because of limited intellect 
that man is not able to understand the nature of  this absolute being 
and to deduce all the consequences. 
When we look at Aristotle in this way, we see him as in many 
respects a predecessor of  Leibniz and Brentano. But even when we 
go back to Aristotle's texts themselves, we Fred good grounds for the 
interpretation presented in Brentano's book. And this, after all, is 
the best reason for recommending it to readers. 
After seventy years this book is still well worth attention, even 
m o r e s o  in the period which seems to be moving towards a new 
Aristotelianism. 
The translation is reliable and is as readable in English as in the 
German original. Rudolf Hailer 





THE DECISION PROBLEM. SOLVABLE CLASSES OF QUANTI- 
FICATIONAL FORMULAS, by Burton Dreben and Warren D. Gold- 
farb, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1979, xii+271 pp. 
There is a well-known theorem, due to Church, that the "decision 
problem" for the first-order predicate calculus is unsolvable, or, in 
other words, that the set of satisfiable first-order formulas is not re. 
cursive. The purpose of this book is to give a systematic account of 
certain (effectively specified) subclasses of formulas whose decision 
problems are solvable. The classes of  formulas treated are usually 
specified by a combination of  quantifier prefix, propositional struc- 
ture, distribution of bound variables, and what are called "coinstantia- 
tions of Herbrand instances." All but the last chapter concerns the 
first-order predicate calculus without identity. 
Chapter 0 introduces basic notation and definitions. The most 
important item is the notion of Herbrand expansion. Most of the 
proofs in the book involve the Expansion Theorem (stated but not 
proved) that a formula is satisfiable iff its sets of Herbrand expansions 
at finite levels are all consistent. Chapter 1 concerns several classes of 
formulas specified by the truth-functional form of the non-quantifi- 
cational matrix. In Chapter 2, the involved techniques are modified 
and extended to what is called the "amenability method".'Chapter 3 
concerns finite controllability: a class of formulas is said to be 
finitely controllable iff each satisfiable formula in the class has a 
f'mite model. It is easy to see that the decision problem for any 
(effectively specified) finitely controllable class of formulas is 
solvable. The authors show that the classes treated in Chapters 1 
and 2 are finitely controllable, develop a technique, called the 
"amiability method", for proving finite controllability, and show 
several other classes to be finitely controllable. Chapter 4 deals with 
a particular class of formulas, called the "Maslov class", which is 
shown to be finitely controllable. Chapter 5 concerns the solvability 
of the decision problems of classes of formulas that are not known to 
be f'mitely controllable. Chapter 6 develops techniques for reducing 
the decision problems of some classes to those of others. Several 
solvability and unsolvability results are thereby obtained. Chapter 7 
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relates the solvability of the decision problems of certain classes to 
coinstantiations within the Herbrand expansions of each formula. 
The Final Chapter 8 concerns the first-order predicate calculus with 
identity. The focus of the chapter is the extent to which earlier 
techniques can be extended to this calculus. The most important 
single item here is the result (due to Goldfarb) that the set of satis- 
fiable formulas in the so-called "G6del-Kalmar-Sch~itte" class with 
identity is n o t  primitive recursive. It is a major open problem to de- 
termine whether this class of formulas is recursive. This, together 
with the primitive recursiveness of the analogous class without 
identity, illustrates the authors' remark that decision problems in 
the first-order predicate calculus with identity are often substantially 
more complex than analogous problems in the predicate calculus 
without identity. The book contains an appendix which deals with 
some related topics and presents a few longer proofs, and closes 
with a four-page bibliography, a list of the solvability results, an 
index of the special notation, and a general index. 
The authors are aware of the fact that most of the results in the 
book would have little intrinsic interest if they were considered in 
isolation. The concern is with overall expansiveness and technique. 
They write in the Introduction: " . . . t h e  enterprise may look like a 
pointless taxonomy. However . . . .  our interest is not in individual 
results, but in the picture given by the results taken as a whole, 
together with the methods used to obtain them." A thoughtful 
reader earl obtain valuable insights into the nature of satisfiability 
from the results throughout the book relating the solvability of 
decision problems to quantifier and propositional structure. An 
interesting example of this is the extended discussion of "Skolem 
classes" in Chapter 6 which relates connections between different 
kinds of quantified variables to the solvability (and the unsolvability) 
of decision problems. 
The concern with technique is well born out by the presentation. 
The techniques are usually first displayed on classes whose decision 
problems are otherwise known to be solvable-, and, quite often, the 
same classes are treated more than once to exhibit different tech- 
niques. A typical sequence consists of (1) a discription of a possible 
technique for showing the solvability of decision problems or, at 
least, overcoming some difficulties related to  unsolvability, (2) a 
discussion of conditions (on classes of formulas) necessary for the 
technique to work, (3) the presentation of a class (or classes) saris- 
fying the conditions, and (4) proofs of the solvability of the relevant 
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decision problems. Often, the proof techniques are themselves 
examined. The authors sometimes show, for example, why the 
presented proofs cannot be extended to the entire class of formulas, 
even though the fact that the proofs can't be so extended is well 
known. 
The concern for technique, however, is sometimes obscured by 
the attention to detail and rigor. This is occasionally compounded 
by the special notation. It is therefore recommended that one reading 
the book for the first time focus on the more discursive material 
and merely skim the detailed proofs. The book is well-constructed 
for such a reading. 
It can be noted, as an aside, that the authors claim that all but 
one of the presented solvability results are "constructive". By this, 
they mean that for each considered class (but one), an algorithm for 
determining which members of the class are satisfiable is actually 
exhibited (or, at any rate, an algorithm can easily be constructed 
from the proofs). Primitive recursive bounds on the number of 
steps required for the algorithms to terminate are also provided. 
However, the proofs that the presented algorithms work are not 
always constructive and, moreover, the decision problems con- 
sidered are not constructive decision problems. That is, the concern 
is with the existence of models, not the possibility of constructing 
them. Thus, the above clgms about constructivity can only be born 
out in a formal system with both constructive and classical connectives 
and quantifiers (such systems are developed in the forthcoming In- 
tensional Mathematics, ed. by S. Shapiro, North Holland Publishing 
Co.) It should be noted, however, that if "decision problems" are taken 
as concerning non-refutability rather than satisfiability, then all 
but one of the results in the book are either (completely) constructive 
or can be made constructive. (Of course, G6del's completeness 
theorem states that satisfiability is coextensive with non-refutability, 
but the proof thereof is not constructive.) Also, the results obtained 
by using the amenability method (developed in Chapter 2) and the 
amiability method (devel6ped in Chapter 3) provide straightforward 
techniques for constructing models of satisfiable formulas in the 
given classes. 
A student of computability quickly learns that nearly allinteresting 
non-trivial sets of formulas are not recursive. Thus, his or her atten- 
tion is almost exclusively devoted to proofs of unsolvability - to 
showing that algorithms with certain properties do not exist. Since 
this book is concerned with the solvability of decision problems, it 
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presents and develops many deep and interesting techniques for 
showing solvability and, thus, proving the existence of algorithms. 
It is therefore a valuable and welcome addition to the technical 
literature on computability. 
Ohio State University - Newark 
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THE CONCEPTS OF SPACE AND TIME: THEIR STRUCTURE 
AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT, edited by M. ~apek. Boston and 
Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976,1vii+ 
570 pp. 
In this mammoth volume, (~apek has included seventy-nine selec- 
tions and a lengthy introduction that discuss the structure and the 
historical development of the concepts of space and time, as well as 
some of the philosophical problems that such concepts give rise to. 
The selections are divided into three parts. Part 1 deals with ancient 
and classical ideas of space. Part 2 concerns the classical and ancient 
concepts of time, and Part 3 deals with modern views of space and 
time and their anticipations. I shall proceed by first making some 
general remarks about the selections in each part and then I shall 
turn to a more detailed examination of what I think (and I think 
Capek would agree) is a fundamental issue in the philosophy of time 
namely, the ontological status of becoming. 
The guiding principle behind the selections chosen to convey the 
ancient and medieval views of space is that they should enable the 
reader to have a comprehensive view and a proper perspective of the 
period under consideration. In order to achieve these aims ~apek 
chose most of the selections for Part 1 from secondary sources. 
Particularly useful in organizing the issues about space that concerned 
the ancient and medievals are (~apek'.s own introductory comments, 
F.M. Cornford's "The Invention of Space," and the several newly 
translated selections from Le Syst~me du Monde, by P. Duhem on 
Plato, Aristotle, John Philopon, and St. Thomas. In addition, Part 1 
includes, most notably, Descartes "On Space as Plenum," a criticism 
of Descartes by H. More "On the Difference between Extension and 
Matter," a newly translated selection by Gassendi on "The Reality of 
Infinite Void," Newton "On Absolute Space and Motion," Locke on 
"Inf'mite Space and Its Difference from Matter," and Russell's 
"Early Defense of Newton's Absolute Space." 
Part 2 on the classical and ancient concepts of time also includes 
several interesting commentaries on ancient philosopher's reflections 
or time. The first selection in Part 2, Comford's ''The Elimination of 
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Time by Parmenides," raises an issue that is a central one in the 
philosophy of time and one that occupies a prominent place in 
Capek's introduction. According to Cornford, Parmenides maintains 
"that all becoming and change must be mere meaningless words. 
The One Being exists always and as a whole; nothing more and nothing 
different can be added" (p. 141). According to~apek,  the denial of 
becoming and change has its source in fallacy of "spatialization of 
time." To deny the reality of becoming is, for (~apek, tantamount to 
denying the reality of time, and to assert with the Eleatics that all of  
reality is one whole, coexisting together. Thus, not only is "the 
fallacy of 'spatialization of time' one of the most persistent features 
of our intellectual tradition" (xxvi), it leads, from t~apek's point of 
view, to the most deplorable view that time is unreal. I would not 
wish to dispute that Parmenides denied the reality of time, but I do 
wish to dispute ~apek's claim that (i) to deny becoming is to deny 
time itself, and (ii) that the denial of becoming and the spatialization 
of time entail that all events coexist. Thus, the fundamental issue 
that is raised concerns the relation between becoming and time. On 
that issue, more later. 
Returning to the selections themselves, Part 2 contains, amongst 
others, selections from Aristotle and Russell "On Time, Motion, and 
Change," S. Sambursky on "The Stoic Views of Time," Augustine's 
"Views on Time," Newton "On Time," Locke "On Succession and 
Duration," Russell and Bergson, "On Zeno's Paradoxes," and a first 
translation in English of a useful section in Gassendi's Syntasma 
Philosphicum, Physicae entitled, "The Reality of Absolute Time." 
The selection on Augustine's views on time is good as far as it goes 
but it does not go far enough. It includes a section from Augustine 
on the beginning of time and on Augustine's denial that time is the 
motion of  bodies. Unfortunately, it does not include a section on 
the problems Augustine raises concerning the measurement of time, 
nor does it include a section on Augustine's positive views on time 
offered in response to the problems of measurement. Similarly, 
the selection by Russell, "On Change, Time and Motion" includes 
several relevant sections from the Principles of Mathematics, but 
excludes the crucial section (442) where Russell defines change. 
Another surprising omission from Parts 1 and 2 are any of Kant's 
writings, t~apek does include a selection from Schopenhauer "On 
the Necessary Attributes of Time and Space," that is a concise 
summary of the Kantian views of space and time. Nevertheless, 
the close connection between the reality of absolute space and 
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certain fundamental ontological (as opposed to scientific) questions 
is missed by omitting some selection from, say, Kant's precritical 
writings, e.g., "Concerning the Ultimate Foundations of the Differ- 
entiations of Regions in Space." 
The emphasis on the scientific as opposed to the philosophical 
development of the concept of time is more apparent in Part 3 
which deals with the modern views of space and time and their anti- 
cipations. It includes pre-relativistic criticisms of absolute space and 
time by Berkeley, Leibniz, Boscovich, StaUo and Mach. Also included 
are anticipations of the physical significance of non-Euclidian geo- 
metries by Clifford and Calinon. Further, there are selections by 
Whitehead, Weiner, Bohm and Weyl on some consequences of 
quantum theory. However, the main contents of Part 3 "are the 
problems related to relativistic space-time" (xviii). According to 
~apek the central issue in relativistic physics is "the philosophical 
or ontological meaning of Minkowski's famous treatise on space and 
time" (xlv). There are basically two interpretations of Minkowski's 
fusion of space with time. One is the static, becomingless view re- 
presented in this volume by selections by Griinbaum, G6del and 
James Jeans. The other is the dynamic, becoming view represented 
in selections by ~apek, Eddington, and Whitrow. The central place 
that the issue plays in ~apek's own thoughts is revealed by the fact 
that only Grfinbaum's article on "The Exclusion of Becoming from 
Physical Reality," is discussed in detail in ~apek's introduction. 
Since the "static" vs "the becoming" view is such a central issue and 
since I believe that ~apek's criticism of the static view is seriously 
flawed, I shall devote the remainder of the review to it. 
According to ~apek, Grfinbaum's views on time "leads to an in. 
tolerable dualism of two realms - the subjective one, to which be- 
coming because of its 'mind-dependence' is confined, and the be- 
comingless world of physics" (xlvii). ~apek further claims that, 
"such a sharp metaphysical dichotomy creates even greater difficulties 
than the traditional Cartesian dualism; for, according to Descartes, 
both mental and physical realms, despite their profound differences, 
share at least their temporal character; they both belong to the realm 
of change, i.e., becoming. But in the doctrine of 'mind-dependence 
of becoming' we have two realms which have nothing in common 
and whose relations and interactions remain completely unintelli- 
gible" (xlvii). (~apek attempts to explicate what is involved in 




Griinbaum maintains that becoming, the "now," or "the moving 
present" is subjective, i.e., mind-deoendent. Since scientific theory 
tells us that, say, sensory qualities such as color, sweet, and sour are 
also subjective, Griinbaum asks, rehetorically, "Why is the mind de- 
pendence of becoming more perplexing than the mind-dependence 
of common sense color attributes?" (p. 487) Capek responds by 
saying that there is a fundamental disanalogy between sensory 
qualities and becoming. He claims that although it is possible, and in 
fact true, that the objective stimulus of color is altogether different 
from the sensory quality of color, "it is impossible to claim that 
there is no objective, physical counterpart to what we experience as 
becoming . . . "  (xlviii). Capek's premise for that claim is that "no 
matter how dissimilar sensory qualities are from physical stimuli, 
they both occur in succession and thus exhibit basically the same 
temporal order" (xlvii). Further on he repeats the same idea when he 
says, "The only difference between the temporal order of our 
consciousness and that of physical reality is that the latter is far more 
complex and f'mely grained. But temporal they both are" (xlviii). 
Granting the premise, why does ~apek think that it follows that 
becoming cannot belong solely to the realm of experience, but must 
belong to physical reality. The answer is that he takes forgranted or 
assumes that becoming is the ontological ground of  succession. With 
t~apek's assumption made explicit his first argument against Griin- 
baum may be restated as follows: (1) Without becoming there cannot 
be succession. (2) Without succession there cannot be time. (3) Since, 
however, both the realm of experience and the realm of physics are 
temporal realms, i.e., they contain succession, it follows that (4) 
Griinbaum is mistaken in maintaining that becoming belongs only 
to the realm of  experince and not the realm of  physics. 
Capek's 'argument, or to be more specific, its first premise, either 
completely misunderstands Griinbaum's view, or begs the question 
against it. He,misunderstands Griinbaum's view if he thinks the 
mind-dependence of becoming entails that events in physical reality 
do not stand in objective temporal relations. Grfinbaum quite ex. 
plicitly denies the implication when he says: 
The temporal relations of earlier (before) and later (after) can 
obtain between two physical events independently of the 
transient now, and of any minds . . . .  And to assert in that 
becoming is mind-dependent is not to assert that the obtaining 
of the relation of temporal precedence among physical events 
is mind-dependent' (p. 472). 
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On the other hand, if Capek just assumes that there cannot be 
temporal relations in the physical world unless there is objective 
becoming, then he is begging the question. The issue is ultimately, 
the ontological status of temporal relations. For Gr~nbaum and 
other so-called B-theorists temporal relations are simple and unanalys- 
able entities. That means at least (i) that temporal relations cannot 
be defined in terms of becoming, i.e., the changing of  events with 
respect to the properties of  pastness, presentness, and futurity and 
(ii) that temporal relations can obtain between events even if those 
events do not have temporal properties. Thus, in an argument against 
Grfinbaum one cannot assume that succession is becoming. 
(~apek's second argument against Gr~nbaum is based upon the 
same question begging misinterpretation as the first, for it assumes 
that in a becomingless world there is no time i.e., succession. The 
eonclusion of  ~al~k's second argument is that Griinbaum's "intoler- 
able dualism" turns the physical world into a block universe in 
which all events "really coexist, totum simur' (xlix). If GrOnbaum's 
view leads to that consequence then it is absurd and ought to be 
rejected, but does it lead to that consequence? (~al~k claims, quite 
correctly, that for Grfinbaum "the beeomingless universe does not 
exclude 'temporal separations'" (xlix). What he goes on to say, 
however, is a travesty of  Gr0nbaum's views, 
In using the term 'separation' he - whether unconsciously or 
deliberately - spatializes time. More specifically, he represents 
the succession of two events by a geometrical separation of 
two/uxtaposed points located on a line which he still calls 
'time'. There is no harm in using this spatial symbolism as long 
as it is understood as a mere symbolism, i.e., as'a static transla. 
tion of genuinely successive terms into spatial imagery; but it 
becomes a vicious distortion of the true nature of time as 
soon as it is taken literally. Yet, this is what he does when he 
eliminates becoming (xlix; emphasis added). 
(~apek is simply wrong here. In eliminating becoming one is not 
committed to a literal spatialization of  time, i.e., to thinking of  time 
m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m  
as a line in which all events in time, like points on a line in space, are 
co-existent or simultaneous. In eliminating becoming from physical 
reality all that Griinbaum means to deny is that "belonging to the 
present is a physical attribute of a physical event E which is inde- 
pendent of  any judgmental awareness of the occurrence of  either E 
itself or of  another event simultaneous with it" (p. 480). To deny 
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the existence of a certain physical attribute is not tantamount 
to denying the existence of succession. As Grtinbaum says, 
It is a travesty to equate the objective becominglessness of 
physical events asserted by the thesis with a claim of timeless- 
ness. In this way the thesis of mind-dependence is misrepresent- 
ed as entailing that all events happen simultaneously or form a 
'totum simul'. But it is an egregious blunder to think that if 
the time of physics lacks passage in the sense of there not 
being a transient now, then physical events cannot be temporally 
separated but must all be simultaneous (p. 485). 
Yet, as we have seen, {~apek is guilty of this blunder. A question that 
is worth exploring, if only briefly, is why he commits such a mistake. 
The explanation is to be found in (~apek's belief that the funda- 
mental difference between a temporal and a spatial series is that the 
terms of a temporal series undergo becoming whereas the terms of a 
spatial series do not. In other words, Capek's argument against 
Grtinbaum once again rests on the question begging assumption that 
temporal relations presuppose becoming, i.e. without becoming there 
is no succession. Consider the following passage: "For only becoming 
provides the dynamical feature which differentiates the spatial 'before. 
after' relation from the genuinely temporal succession" (xlix). And 
again, 
 9  as long as we interpret Minkowski's world in a static be- 
comingless sense, the events in it are only verbally successive; 
they really coexist together, totum simul, juxtaposition. Only 
in this way can becoming be excluded from the physical 
reality and be confined to the subjective realm (xlix). 
In other words,~apek is claiming that in denying becoming of physical 
reality Grtinbaum is committed to maintaining that physical reality 
is "timeless." The error consists in assuming that there is only one 
analysis of temporal relations, namely, an analysis that requires be- 
coming. What is particularly disturbing about (~apek's introductory 
remarks on becoming and time is that they were written after 
Griinbaum's essay, and yet they contain-the same criticisms of 
Griinbaum that Griinbaum responded to in the selection included 
in this volume. 
There are two other related criticisms of the B-theory of time 
that ~apek sympathetically mentions. The first is that the B-theory 
implies a "rigorous determinism" (xlvi) and the second is that the B- 
theory (and determinism) cannot answer the question, "If  the future 
history of  the universe pre-exists timelessly.., in its totality, why is 
236 
BOOK REVIEWS 
it not already present?" (li) Both of these objections are found in 
the selection by Whitrow on "'Becoming' and the Nature of Time." 
Whitrow says, 
There is indeed a profound connection between the reality of  
time and the existence of an incalculable element in the 
universe. Strict causality would mean that the consequences 
pre-exist in the premises. But, if the future history of the uni- 
verse pre-exists logically in the present, why is it not already 
present . . . .  The fact of  transition and 'becoming' compels us 
to recognize the existence of an element of indeterminism 
and irreducible contingency in the universe (p. 530)9 
There are all sorts of confusions and misunderstandings involved in 
this passage. For one, it assumes that the reality of time amounts 
to the reality of  becoming, which in turn rests on the questionable 
assumption that temporal relations require temporal becoming. Of 
this we have already dealt with. It also assumes that there are neces- 
sary connections between "strict causality" (or determinism), the 
denial of  becoming, and the "block universe." There are, however, 
no such necessary connections. To say that all events exist (tenselessly) 
in the sense of. occurring at particular clock times does not:entail 
that they all exist at the same time. If there are simple temporal 
relations between events which exist at different clock times, then 
they do not all exist at the same time. Furthermore, the B-theory 
does not entail that all events are determined, i.e., informationally 
ascertainable, even though it does entail that all events are determin. 
ate, i.e., "intrinsically attribute-specific in the sense of tenselessly 
being what it is at a certain clock time t"  (p. 493). Moreover, even if 
a becomingless view of time did entail determinism, it would not 
follow that such a view entails that the future history of the universe 
pre-exists in the present, since determinism does not imply that the 
future pre-exists in the present. As Griinbaum says, 
Whitrow ignores the fact that states hardly need to be simul- 
taneous just because they are related to one-to-one functions. 
How, one may ask, does the fact that a future state is uniquely 
specified by a present state detract in the least from its being 
later and entail that it paradoxically exists at present? (p. 495) 
Furthermore, he says that, 
 9  we have learned from the theory of  relativity that events 
sustain time-like separations to one another because of their 
casual cormectibility or deterministic relatedness, not despite 
that deterministic relatedness (p. 496)9 
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The point to note here is not so much who is correct in this dispute, 
although I believe that Grfinbaum clearly has the upper hand, but 
that ~apek in his introduction raises Whitrow's objections without 
discussing Griinbaum's response to them. 
Part 3 contains several classic selections including Mach's "Criticism 
of Newton's Concept of Absolute Space," and Minkowski's paper on 
"The Union of Space and Time." I can't help but think that some of 
the confusion that lies behind Capek's discussion of the ontological 
status of becoming (and his critique of Griinbaum) rests on his view. 
hag the issue of becoming as a question of the correct interpretation 
of Minkowski's union of space and time. For if one thinks of the 
"static" interpretation of Minkowski's representation as a spatializa- 
tion of time, then since Minkowski talks of world lines, one is liable 
to think of  time on the static interpretation as merely a spatial string 
(line) of events (points), and consequently conclude that to spatialize 
time is to make all events simultaneous. As I understand the issue, 
however, the interpretation of the Minkowskian "world lines" is 
irrelevant to the fundamental issue which is the ontologich, status 
of succession, t~apek maintains that the relativistic union of space 
with time is far more appropriately characterized as a "dynamization 
of space rather than a spatialization of time" (9. 515). His basic 
reason for this seems to be that "while there is no juxtaposition of 
events which would be a juxtaposition in for all frames of reference, 
there are certain types o f  succession which remain such in all systems'" 
(p. 514). But the existence of succession in all frames of reference 
does not entail the existence of a transient now or becomirlg unless 
there are no simple temporal relations. Thus, Minkowski's theory 
does not support the becoming view, nor is it incompatible ~rith the 
B.theory. In fact, if we are to resolve the issue at all, we must leave 
the realm of physics and turn to the realm of metapl~vsics, and that 
leads me to my Final point. 
Capek's book is noticeably lacking in recent philosophical, as 
opposed to scientific analysis of the concepts of space and time. 
For example, neither McTaggart's article on "The Unreality of Time" 
nor any of  the numerous and valuable discussions of it are included. 
Nor does the book contain any selections from the work of R. Gale 
or A.N. Prior, philosophers who have recently attempted a systematic 
exposition and defense of the theory of becoming. Griinbaum's 
paper although it does present a reasonably clear statement of the 
B-theory is too embedded in a scientific ontology to be the main 
expository article of that view. Finally, the doctrine of the specious 
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present and the problems that it gives to, though fundamental to 
any complete conception of time, does not have one article devoted 
to a discussion of i t ." 
L. Nathan Oaklander 
The University of Michigan-Flint 
Flint, Michigan 48503 
USA 
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1DENTITY AND ESSENCE, by Baruch A. Brody. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, x+164 pp. 
One of the reasons why the subject matter of this book has been 
a source of great fascination to a large number of philosophers is 
no doubt that it constitutes the meeting place for so many of the 
central topics of logic as well as of metaphysics. Issues like the 
set-theoretical paradoxes; the axiom of extensionality;impredicative 
definitions; adverbial modifications; rigid designators; referential 
opacity and the de re - de dicto distinctions are major issues of pure 
logic. On the other hand, problems like personal identity, personal 
survival and the immortality of the soul; essential properties and 
substantial or accidental changes are typical metaphysical problems. 
All these and more converge and intermingle in Brody's lucid, little 
book. 
The main thing many readers will probably want to know is 
why, in view of the fact that there are already a large number of 
books devoted to this area of philosophy, should they read this 
particular work which contains mostly very superficial and un- 
defended assertions, when not downright errors and elementary 
fallacies? The partial answer is, that the value of a philosophical 
work is not fully determined by the amount of sound arguments 
and true statements it contains. Nicholas Griffin concludes his 
judicious review of Brody's book with the following instructive 
remark: 
Despite the fact that Brody's book seems to me mistaken 
on all main points, it would nonetheless make a fine under- 
graduate text - partly because of it's errors and partly because 
of its clarity. (Canadian Phil. Reviews, 1981, p. 247). 
Philosophy is commonly regarded as one of the hardest subjects to 
teach. Fortunately this is counterbalanced by the availability of 
special pedagogical devices not applicable in most other disciplines. 
One of these is the possibility to ask students to read a paragraph 
or two of a given text and then ask them a number of brief questions. 




The following remarkable example concerns Max Black's often 
discussed claim that he has produced a counter-example to Leibnitz's 
Principle of  the identity of  indiscernibles. Black asserts that it is 
logically possible to have a universe which contained nothing except 
two exactly similar spheres where every quality and relational 
characteristic o f  the one would also be a property of  the other.  
Brody disagrees and maintains that Black's case does not really 
involve two distinct objects that have, without exception, all their 
properties in common:  
After all if there are two such objects then each is such that 
there is an object with which it and only it is identical. So each 
must have a unique property,  even if it cannot specify the 
property because (as Black reminds us) we have no way of  
specifying the object (p. 19). 
This suggests the following question to be posed for students: 
Suppose someone maintained 
H -- There are in fact 17 Eiffel Towers in Paris 
Why, if we followed Brody, H may have to be regarded as well 
continued as the universally held hypothesis that there is but one 
Eiffel Tower? Alternatively, why according to Herbert Feigl's 
sagacious dictum 'a difference must make a difference' any discus- 
sion as to how many Eiffel Tower are there in Paris may be devoid 
all meaning? 
ANSWER: Brody's reply to Black seems to concede that his two 
spheres a and b differ in absolutely no such contingent properties 
like that a is located in one place while b is located elsewhere, or 
that a has the disposition of  attracting toward itself a third body if 
it were placed nearer to a than to b. Nevertheless, he believes, that  
the property of  'being-identical - with - itself' is sufficient to dis- 
tinguish the two spheres from one another. According to H then even 
though the 17 towers, E~, E2 . . .  Et7 are empirically indistinguish- 
able they are discernible in the required sense. E i for instance has the 
unique property of  being - identical - with E i, a property that Ej 
does not have, where i ~: j. 
The feeble claim on Brody's behalf that it is because of  the 
principle of  simplicity that we do not postulate more than a single 
Eiffel Tower should not be very convincing. After all the main 
function of  that principle is to be a safeguard against cluttering up 
the universe with superfluous entities but  the 16 extra towers do not 
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increase at all the crowdedness of the world. Furthermore since it 
makes not the slightest difference how many Eiffel Towers there 
exist, the whole question may be said to lack substance. 
To obtain greater clarity, we should ask why Brody did not 
claim that a and b differ not merely in one but in indefinitely 
many properties? For example, while a and b are of  the same 
mass, it is only contingently so, whereas b is necessarily of  the same 
mass as itself. Thus a would be claimed to differ from b in that a 
is merely contingently equal in mass to b while b is necessarily 
equal in mass to b. The same goes of course for equality in volume, 
temperature, electric charge etc., etc. 
But the folly of such claim would have probably been far too 
evident. The fact that a is merely contingently equal in mass to b 
is no t  discernible as such. Unless it is already given that a is not 
identical with b, there are no means for determining whether a 
has necessarily or merely contingently the same mass as b. It should 
be absurd to interpret Leibnitz as saying that even when the discerni- 
bility of a and b can be established in no other way but through 
the assumption that they are distinct entities, that will do in order 
to guarantee that a and b are distinct entitles. Clearly, for the purpose 
of Leibnitz's principle what is required is a difference that may be 
detected prior to ascertaining that a and b are separate particulars. 
This is the reason why a property of a like that of  its not - being - 
identical - with b is also useless in the present context. It cannot be 
determined to be had by a unless we are given first that a and b 
are two distinct spheres. 
Another illustration not requiring the unravelling of any complex 
issues concerns Brody's discussion of the following two sentences: 
(c 0 All cyclists are essentially two-legged but not essentially rational. 
(#) All mathematicians are essentially rational but not essentially 
two-legged. 
Quine asks us to consider Joe who is both a mathematician and a 
cyclist. He claims that (a) and ~ )  jointly entail that Joe both is and 
is n o t  essentially two-legged and essentially rationalIBrody then pre- 
sents a proposal to remove the contradiction by maintaining that 
both (a) and (fl) are false: cyclists are not  essentially two-legged 
since 'a cyclist can lose a leg and still continue to exist'; mathema- 
ticians are n o t  essentially rational 'a mathematician can stop being 
rational and still continue to exist although he cannot then do any 
more mathematics' (p. 86) 
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QUESTION: Consider the two sentences 
(a*)Any raven is definitely black but may or may not be airborne 
(#*)Any frightened winged bird is definitely airbome but may or 
may not be black 
and show how these two may appear to lead to a contradiction. Ex- 
plain why in fact they do not lead to any contradiction. 
ANSWER: Let us consider an individual X which is a frightened 
raven. If we were to follow Brody we might conclude that X both 
is and is no t  definitely black and airborne. 
No sensible person would of course argue like this. The individual 
X, by virtue of being a raven is assured no more than being black, 
since ravenhood and blackness are definitely interlinked. Ravenhood 
and being airborne,.~re not. However, if the additional property of 
being frightened is also acquired by X then that imposes upon it the 
further property of being on the wing. 
Incidentally, while of  course a cyclist may lose a leg and continue 
to exist he cannot continue to exist as a cyclist - or be a cyclist - 
but as someone who used to be a cyclist. Contrary to Brody there- 
fore (a) is not false. Nether is (~). 
Naturally, Brody did not plan to provide acompilation of illumina- 
ting errors for the use of  the philosophy teacher. It was however part 
of his intention to write a book containing a clear and concise intro- 
duction to his chosen topic and to acquaint the reader with the 
various important aspects of  the many faceted issue of identity and 
essence. I believe he has succeeded to a large measure in this. 
University of  North Carolina 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 
USA 
George N. Schlesinger 
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THE TEST OF TIME: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHE- 
TICS by Anthony Savile. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, 319 pp. 
Samuel Johnson, one of  the earliest, clearest, and most cogent ex- 
ponents of the test of time as a criterion for evaluating aesthetic 
merit, formulated this test as "length of duration and continuance of 
esteem" and fixed the minimal duration to satisfy it at one hundred 
years. Though Anthony Savile's book, The Test of  Time, will not, 
I'm afraid, survive this test, I nonetheless think it an excellent book. 
This might suggest merely that time's test works differently with 
philosophy than with art (which is Savile's area of concern), but I 
think it rather indicates a fundamental limitation and weakness in 
the evaluative criterion of the test of time, at least in the version that 
Savile so painstakingly formulates, analyzes, and defends. 
Though Savile's book is uncompromisingly devoted to the proper 
interpretation and the legitimation of temporal survival as a criterion 
of aesthetic value, this concentration does not engender narrowness 
of scope. For Savile's rigorous analysis of this criterion of evaluation 
logically leads him to examine in depth and detail the aims of art 
and some of its crucial properties (like beauty and depth) as well as 
central issues concerning the interpretation, identity, and ontological 
status of the individual artwork. Indeed, one of the book's many 
merits is its recognition of the intrinsic interrelations of these issues 
and its care in trying to resolve them in a mutually consistent and 
satisfying manner. 
The general argument of the book is cleverly and attractively 
structured. Savile begins (chapter 1) by clarifying the criterion of 
time to show that mere survival is not enough to entail value; what is 
required is rather survival "in our attention under an appropriate 
interpretation in a sufficiently embedded [i.e., endorsed by the 
cultural cognoscenti] way" (p. 11). After arguing (chapter 2) that 
the inference from such survival to aesthetic value cannot be ex- 
plained away by psychological self-affirmation, progress in the arts, 
or appeal to the eventual convergence of common sense, Savile 
returns to examine the criterion's requirement for proper inter- 
pretation of the work. Here he contrasts the currently popular 
vibw of open or autonomous interpretation (chapter 3) with what 
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he calls the historicist (essentially intentionalist) position (chapter 4); 
and he argues the superiority of the latter, nor only in terms of its 
consequences for work-identity, ontological status, and, of course, 
interpretation itself, but also in its better accounting for the in- 
ference from survival to value. 
Savile then proceeds to develop the central structure of his 
argument, which, to characterize it very schematically, maintains 
that survival implies value because only something that has real 
value (i.e., has the properties to satisfy the aims of whatever kind 
of thing it happens to be) can resist the pressures toward oblivion 
that time exerts on everything. This schematic argument is filled out 
in great detail by examining the aims of art (chapter 5), the various 
pressures of time (chapter 6), and two properties, depth and beauty, 
which can enable works possessing them to resist time's pressures 
(chapters 7 and 8). 
Having thus far probed the premise of a work of art's survival, 
Savile goes on to examine what sort of value can be inferred from it. 
Here he makes an important distinction between excellence and 
stature (chapter 9). The former pertains to a work being good (or 
excellent or even perfect) of its kind, while the latter relates to a 
work's greatness or genius which transcends any reference to genre, 
and which, according to Savile, is the sole justification of the con- 
tinuing autonomous existence of the institution of art. It is also the 
only value which Savile says can be inferred from his test of time. 
Chapter 10 struggles with the formulation of  a valid deductive proof 
of the above inference, before settling for the claim that survival 
is only defeasible evidence for the value of stature, and stature the 
best explanation for survival. The next chapter tries to reinforce the 
inference from survival to value by showing that certain properties 
(i.e., sentimentality, vulgarity, and obscenity) which are inimical to 
aesthetic value but which may seem to insure continued popularity 
will not secure the required survivial. Finally, the closing chapter 
aims at "establishing time's test as ineliminable from art theory" 
except "at the cost of abandoning significant concern with art 
itself" (p.267). 
This is the general skeleton of the argument, which Savile fleshes 
out with considerable cogency, enviable erudition, and inspiring (if 
often self-defeating) integrity. Though his philosophical style (and 
many of his sources) are characteristically English, Savile demonstrates 
an impressive knowledge of continental (including Marxist) aesthetics 
and an evident mastery of European languages. When quoting from 
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the works of French, German, Spanish, or Italian authors, Savile 
does not rely on available translations, but either supplies his own 
or (all too frequently for this reader) disdains translation entirely. 
The various stages of the argument are closely and above all honestly 
argued. Savile claims no easy points; and the fact that many of the 
objections he unflinchingly raises against his own views and arguments 
seem stronger than his subsequent rejoinders makes the book more 
appealing and convincing though, of course, its specific theses less. 
Although generally sympathetic to time's test, I am not con- 
vinced by Savile's version of it as dependent on a strict canonical 
historical interpretation of the work, and as independent from a 
culture's self-affirmation and the convergence of common sense. If, 
as Savile maintains, passing time's test requires survival under the 
one correct canonical interpretation, how can we say a work like 
Hamlet which has undergone so much change and variety of inter- 
pretation has passed time's test. Yet surely it, if anything, has. How. 
ever, since there is not space here for a detailed account of the points 
where I think Savile's arguments need reinforcement and his views 
adjustment, let me simply point to one general vitiating tendency in 
his theorizing and one serious limitation of his version of time's 
test. 
Savile's book seems weakened by an inclination toward assimilating 
essentialism or univocity which links him to the great tradition of 
essentialist aesthetics. For example, notwithstanding post-Wittgen- 
steinian scepticism about the univocity of 'beautiful', Savile labours 
to supply a general formal definition of beauty. He first provides a 
definition of artistic beauty which may seem plausible, if we accept 
his premise that every work of art is an answer to a specific problem 
in a specific style, a premise which is certainly challengeable and, by 
Savile's own admission, demands further elaboration and argument. 
Then, in the questionable aim of a univocal analysis of beauty, the 
notions of problem and style are dubiously imported into the con- 
cept of natural beauty, which is assimilated to artistic beauty in a 
manner that modifies Savile's original analysis of the latter, making 
it more problematic and less appealing. Similarly, though Savile 
initially employs Goodman's distinction between autographic and 
allographic art, he typically treats art as a uniform whole, particularly 
with respect to the dependence of work-identity on canonical 
historicist interpretation. This seems not only questionable but at 
odds with the autographic/allographic distinction. 
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However, the greatest weakness I find in the test of  time that 
Savile expounds is its severe limitation to judgements of stature, i.e., 
greatness or genius. Criticism is not often concerned with such judge- 
ments but very much concerned instead with judgements of  whether 
a work is good or excellent (of its kind): a good novel, an excellent 
painting, etc. These judgements Savile's test avowedly and unfortu- 
nately fails to accommodate. This is why, as I said at the outset, the 
excellence of Savile's book, like that of an excellent work of art 
that falls short of genius, is perfectly consistent with its failing his 
test of time. 
I close with two petty points. Savile's writing style, frequently 
complex and periphrasitic, would benefit by a more liberal use of  
commas. Finally, though the book is finely produced by a time- 
proven, time-honoured press, time and careful reading will reveal too 
many misprints. In my one reading I found twenty-one in the text 
and notes, as well as some errors of omission and commission in the 
(lone) name index. 
Richard Shusterman 
University of  the Negev 
Beer.Sheva, Israel 
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INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: The Case Against Animals by R.G. 
Frey. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 176 pp. 
How philosophers of future ages will laugh when they uncover 
the random survivals of  the new scholasticism that has emerged in 
the twentieth century, poking its head out like some hoary Medusa 
from under the overturned aegis of  classical metaphysics. 
Frey, as his title announces, intends to argue against the trendy 
case of the recent animal rights advocates who have seized upon. 
ecology, collective guilt about animal protein and the nutritional 
needs of the Third World, humane objections to factory fanning 
methods, and vivisection practices, and the organic diet/health food 
cult which has become an identifying ritual symbol of a segment 
of the middle class in the Western industrial nations. And surely 
some such critique was needed, at least as much as Singer's, Regan's, 
and Midgely's much publicized critiques of agribusiness insensitivity 
were needed s - to take some of the puffery out of the sails of  
Greenpeace priggery and above all, perhaps, the tendency to urge 
millions of acres for wildlife preserves but mealie-meal for the San 
of the Kalahari. 2 
Regrettably, Frey's countercase is founded on an equivocation. 
Animals can have rights, he argues (following Leonard Nelson), only 
if animals have interests. Many animal rights advocates including 
Regan are inclined to agree. But Frey goes on to assign a sense to 
'interests' coextensive with that retired persons use when they speak 
of  concert going, volunteer work, or political activity as among their 
interests. Non-hdman animals do not have interests in this sense, as 
Frey has no difficulty in showing. This sense, however, is not the 
sense relevant to rights claims, which are founded, if they are based 
on the idea of interests, in the notion that animals' states may be 
improved or worsened in some objective way. Frey dismisses the 
objective sense of 'having interests' as equivalent to 'having a good' 
or 'having a need'. He finds this irrelevant ethically to the question 
of rights on the grounds that "anything including tractors can have 
a good, a well-being" (p. 80) - as though the argument that all 
things including plants, inanimate objects and artifacts have (prima 
facie) deserts or rights were a sufficient refutation of the claim that 
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some or any do. I have argued elsewhere that all beings in fact have 
(prima facie) deserts commensurate with their being and legitimate 
deserts (rights) equivalent to their equilibrated interests, Le., counter- 
balanced by all other interests; that human interests are not equatable 
with those of non-human animals because human subjecthood exacts 
a moral claim from all other subjects which non-subjects cannot 
make, in behalf of  the recognition of subjecthood, but that animals 
do invoke moral claims of their own, apprehensible and expressible 
in terms of what I call 'virtual subjecthood' - our capability of 
knowing the sort of  claims non-human beings would make if they 
could articulate their claims) To me it seems immaterial whether 
such claims are called deserts or rights, although I find the term 
deserts to be somewhat less explosively charged. 
Frey, at any rate, seems to have moved his text, based on a quibble, 
past the Clarendon Press readers with the same f'messe that his argu- 
ments must have bypassed his own internal philosophical censors, 
by painstaikingly careful attention to formal nicety but with reckless 
disregard for the soundness of  the general structure of  the argument. 
One can only hope that his next book will pay as close regard to 
veracity as the present one does to formality and detail. 
University of  Hawaii at Manoa 




z See Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and Human Obliga- 
tions, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976. 
2 See especially Garrett Hardin in William Aiken and Hugh La Follette, eds., 
World Hunger and Moral Obligation, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977; 
and cf. Hardin's Promethean Ethics, Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1980. 
s See my Monotheism: A Philosophic lnqutry into the Foundations of  
Theology and Ethics: Totowa, New Jersey, 1981, pp. 92 ft.; The Case of  
the Animals versus Man, Boston: Twayne, 1978, pp. 29-33; On Justice: 
The Littmann Lectures of 1979, forthcoming. 
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